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The Penetration of Technocratic Logic into the Educational Field: 
Rationalizing Schooling from the Progressives to the Present 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
Educational accountability is not a recent invention. Over the course of the 20th century, there 
were three major movements demanding accountability in American education: the efficiency 
reforms of the Progressive Era, the now almost forgotten movement toward accountability in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, and the modern standards and accountability movement, culminating 
in No Child Left Behind. This paper considers the three movements as cases of school 
“rationalization” in the Weberian sense, in that each sought to reduce variation and discretion 
across schools in favor of increasingly formal systems of standardized top-down control. This 
impulse to rationalize schools cannot be explained by interest group or partisan explanations, as 
those that have purveyed the reforms defy easy ideological generalization.  Instead, these 
reforms can be understood as a process of penetration of a “technocratic logic” into the 
educational sphere. In each case, this process exhibited a similar pattern: 1) the creation of a 
crisis of quality which destabilized the existing educational status quo; 2) the elevation of a 
technocratic logic, backed by the knowledge base of a high status epistemic community; 3) the 
rallying of ideologically diverse powerful actors external to the schools behind a 
commensurating logic that promised control and improvement over an unwieldy school system; 
and 4) the inability of the education field to resist (and often to be co-opted by) this technocratic 
logic, due to its historical institutionalization as a highly feminized, weak, bureaucratically-
administered field lacking its own set of widely respected countervailing professional standards. 
Implications suggest that unless teachers are able to develop and organize themselves as a 
stronger field, they will remain at the whim of external actors; professionalization may also 
produce better outcomes than the repeated emphasis on rationalizing reforms. 
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The Penetration of Technocratic Logic into the Educational Field: 
Rationalizing Schooling from the Progressives to the Present 
 
Educational accountability is not a recent invention. Over the course of the 20th century, 
there were three major movements demanding accountability in American education: the 
efficiency reforms of the Progressive Era, the now almost forgotten movement toward 
accountability in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the modern standards and accountability 
movement, culminating in No Child Left Behind. This paper considers the three movements as 
cases of school “rationalization” in the Weberian sense, in that each sought to reduce variation 
and discretion across schools in favor of increasingly formal systems of standardized top-down 
control. This impulse to rationalize schools cannot be explained by interest groups or partisan 
cycles, as those that have purveyed the reforms defy easy generalization.  
This paper offers an alternative explanation, rooted in the penetration of a “technocratic 
logic” into the educational sphere.  In this view, education is a weak professional field, 
susceptible to declarations of crisis that undermine the ability of its professional stewards to 
retain control over its ends and means. At three different times in the nation’s history, ideas of 
scientific management from other fields, particularly business, have penetrated the educational 
sphere and shaped leading reform movements.  In this paper I break this process into four stages, 
exploring in each case the sources of these educational crises, the reasons behind the importing 
of technocratic logics from other fields, how such technocratic logics picked up an array of 
influential political backers, and, finally the inability of educators to resist these external logics. 
The combination of the nation’s longstanding high regard for business methods and values, the 
seemingly perpetual crises of quality of schooling, and the weak organization of the teaching 
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profession has again and again resulted in the insertion of external logics that promise to 
rationalize the educational field.  
The implications of this analysis are that while we often analyze school reform in terms 
of the effects of this or that program, in a broader view it may be the way that the entire sector is 
organized that is problematic.  From this perspective, the choice to organize teaching into a 
bureaucratically-administered hierarchy, where teachers’ role is to implement programs derived 
by others, rather than a profession, wherein members of the field take responsibility for assuring 
a common standard of quality practice, has had enduring consequences. It has made the kind of 
principal-agent logic that characterizes accountability regimes seem repeatedly alluring, despite 
the well-known limitations of this approach (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Elmore 2004, 
Cohen and Moffitt 2009). And it has left educators vulnerable to outsiders seeking to rationalize 
the field, despite the fact that their methods are often insufficient to produce improved 
educational outcomes.  Emerging international evidence is beginning to suggest that nations 
which outpace the United States have stronger professions and have organized their sectors more 
around professional than hierarchical accountability (Tucker and Schleicher 2010), which may 
be a more promising path towards large-scale improvement. 
 
THREE ERAS OF RATIONALIZING SCHOOLING 
In the Progressive Era, a group of reformers comprised mostly of businessmen, city 
elites, and university professors sought to shift power from large local ward boards that they saw 
as parochial and unprofessional to smaller boards controlled by professional elites. They 
empowered the superintendent as the “CEO” of the school system, and directed him to use the 
latest in scientific methods and modern management techniques to measure outcomes and ensure 
 3 
that resources were being used efficiently to produce the greatest possible bang for the buck. The 
newly emerging science of testing was used widely to ensure that teachers and schools were up 
to standards and to sort students into appropriate tracks, with the aim of “efficiently” matching 
students with the curriculum appropriate to their ability.   
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a second accountability movement took hold of 
American schooling, this time at the state level.  Seeking to realize both a civil rights agenda of 
improving the quality of schooling and to satisfy more conservative concerns about the efficient 
spending of public dollars, no fewer than 73 laws were passed between 1963 and 1974 seeking to 
create standards or to utilize a variety of scientific management techniques to improve schooling. 
Frequently overlooked by educational historians in favor of more prominent movements around 
desegregation and open schooling, the template that developed largely under the radar in the late 
1960s and early 1970s would prefigure the modern movement towards school accountability.  
Given this backdrop, the current standards and accountability movement is in fact the 
third such movement of the century. Launched initially by the famous A Nation at Risk report in 
1983, a standards movement swept the states in the 1980s and 1990s before becoming part of 
federal law in the 1994 and 2001 reauthorizations of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (the 2001 reauthorization became known as No Child Left Behind). As we will see, many of 
the objections to NCLB—too much testing; testing narrows the curriculum; the law unfairly 
holds school accountable for events outside their control—are almost exact replays of the 
criticisms of accountability movements earlier in the century. 
These three movements (1900 – 1920, 1963 – 1974, and 1983 – present) share certain 
features of organizational rationalization.1 In the name of efficiency, all three movements sought 
to reduce the variation among schools in favor of greater centralized standardization and control, 
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hallmarks of the rationalizing process. Power shifted upwards, in each of the cases, away from 
teachers and schools and towards centralized administrators.2 Similar conceptions of motivation 
underlay the three sets of reforms, each using some version of standards and testing to 
incentivize teachers to do their bidding.  Each of the movements prized quantitative data, and 
elevated a scientific vision of data-driven improvement over a more humanistic view of 
educational purposes.  Despite the differences in time periods, the essence of the rationalizing 
vision has remained remarkably unchanged.  
There are at least two ways to think about these repeated bouts of rationalizing reforms. 
One is as three distinct episodes, each of which had their own precipitating events, lead actors, 
and key ideas.  The question from this perspective is about whether there are similar patterns 
across these episodes, or similar sets of factors which tend to precipitate or sustain them. A 
second way is to see them as part of an unbroken trajectory; here the question is less about what 
prompts each of them, and more about whether there is something which makes American 
school reform continuously inclined towards accountability centered approaches. I take up both 
questions in the space below.  
 
THE USUAL SUSPECTS:  INTEREST GROUPS, PARTISAN CYCLES, AND VALUE CONFLICTS 
 These repeated efforts to impose accountability on schools are not easily explained by 
conventional theories. Consider interest group explanations. Looking across the cases, an almost 
bewildering array of actors have been important in championing the reforms: good government 
reformers and schools of education in the Progressive Era, state departments of education, state 
legislators, and taxpayers groups in the 1960s/1970s reforms, and governors, presidents, state 
and federal legislators, foundations, business groups, and civil rights groups in the most recent 
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round of reforms. Business groups, who might be the most natural suspect given the character of 
the reforms, played a secondary role to governors in the contemporary reforms (see Author 2006 
for more details), and were not a central factor in the 1960s reforms. Schools of education, who 
were critical champions of the Progressive Era reforms have frequently been critics of the most 
recent accountability movement. In short, while various powerbrokers have been involved in 
each of the reforms, there is no group that has repeatedly been the champion of school 
accountability efforts. 
 There also have not been clear partisan patterns in movements for school accountability. 
Tyack and Cuban (1995: 45) note that, in contrast to other countries, in the United States “at any 
one time Democratic and Republican parties have not differed very much in their views of 
education even if they had quite different policies in other domains.” This more general pattern 
seems to apply similarly to accountability policies—in each era members of both parties were 
supportive of the reforms, if not always for exactly the same reasons. In the Progressive Era, 
members of both parties pushed for control of schools to be put in the hands of centralized 
professional administrators. In both the 1960s/1970s and in the present, liberals supported 
accountability as a mechanism for improving school quality for high poverty students, while 
conservatives were attracted by its ability to monitor the efficiency of spending of public 
dollars.3 In part because of this bipartisan support, accountability and standards have been able to 
flourish regardless of which party was in power, most recently in the championing of standards 
first by President Clinton and then by George W. Bush. In each era, the key question is not 
which party pushed the reforms, but how politicians of both parties came to see accountability as 
the promised path to school improvement. 
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 Tyack and Cuban (1995: 41) offer a third view of the reasons for cycles of policy talk. 
Their view is that these cycles are “an inevitable result of conflict of values and interests built 
into a democracy system of school governance and reflecting changing climates of public 
opinion. People are constantly criticizing and trying to improve public education. From time to 
time, worries about society and schooling so accumulate the widespread educational reform 
ensues.” This view, while plausible, is couched at such a high level of generality that it is almost 
not falsifiable. Perhaps this is unavoidable in trying to offer a workable theory that would 
encompass all of the pendulum swings in American education. When considering a more specific 
set of reforms, such as the recurring interest in testing and accountability, a more specific theory 
can be hazarded. 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: THE POWER OF IDEAS AND THE WEAKNESS OF THE EDUCATIONAL FIELD 
The limits of these approaches suggest a need for a different explanation. The argument 
that follows advances a cultural approach that draws upon two literatures—one in political 
science and one in sociology—to develop an argument about how and why rationalizing schools 
has seemed repeatedly alluring.  
From political science, the argument draws on the literature on the power of ideas or 
paradigms in the policy process (Hall 1989, 1993, Berman 1998, Campbell 2002, Beland and 
Hacker 2004, Author 2010, Davies 1999, 2002). These literatures have emphasized the ways in 
which how a problem is defined (Rochefort and Cobb 1994) is critical to understanding how the 
politics of an issue play out. In other work, I have argued that “paradigms can shape politics” 
(Author 2012, see also Baumgartner and Jones 1993), meaning that once a problem is defined, it 
has the power to shape a policy domain, shaping what solutions are seen as desirable and who 
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participates in the subsequent debate. Ideas are particularly well-suited to explaining change (or 
in this case multiple episodes of change) because different views of a problem are constantly 
swirling, and when one achieves particular salience, it can fairly rapidly spark a series of inter-
related developments, leading to significant change in a relatively short period of time. 
Important to this ideational approach is the way in which successful ideas resonate with 
the broader cultural context in which they are placed (Ferree et al. 2002). In the case of the logic 
of managerial accountability, reformers have benefitted from the association with leading 
business methods and more generally the high regard for business in American life (Hofstadter 
1963). We will also see that the two more successful movements—in the Progressive period and 
from 1980 to the present—have not coincidentally corresponded with two moments in American 
history in which business was highly venerated. 
From sociology, the argument builds on the literature about fields and professions. Pierre 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) has conceptualized society as a series of fields, with 
each seeking to develop and extend its logic into other fields. Similarly, Andrew Abbott’s (1988) 
work has seen professions as competing with one another for jurisdictional control.  This work 
builds on those traditions, and seeks to link them more directly to politics, suggesting that the 
way in which a field institutionalizes directly affects its social, cultural, and political power, and 
thus the degree of respect it garners from other actors.  If the power of ideas helps to explain 
bursts of activity in educational reform, the failed professionalization of teaching explains the 
continuity in the nature of what is proposed and the recurring inability of educators to resist 
external reforms.  
 With these perspectives as background, an examination of the data suggests that across 
eras movements to impose school accountability follow a remarkably similar process by which a 
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“technocratic logic” comes to penetrate the educational field: 1) the declaration of a crisis of 
quality which destabilized the existing educational status quo; 2) the elevation of a 
“technocratic” institutional logic, backed by the knowledge base of a high status epistemic 
community, that resonated with the broader climate of the times; 3) the rallying of ideologically 
diverse powerful actors external to the schools behind a commensurating logic that promised 
control and improvement over an unwieldy school system; and 4) the inability of the education 
field to resist (and often to be co-opted by) this technocratic logic, due to its historical 
institutionalization as a highly feminized, weak, bureaucratically-administered semi-professional 
field lacking its own set of widely respected countervailing professional standards. The ideas and 
professions lenses are connected in that the way that the field is structured—as a public 
bureaucracy with a weak profession—makes the ideas of rationalization from above seem 
repeatedly attractive. 
 By technocratic logic, I mean technical theories of how to make systems function more 
efficiently. Technocratic solutions differ from political solutions, which emphasize the inherent 
tradeoffs in different policy choices.  While in some sense all policies are political, technocratic 
solutions promise improved performance through gains in efficiency, effectively masking the 
need for distributive tradeoffs.  Technocratic solutions also differ from domain-specific 
approaches (in this case education-specific approaches), in that the essence of their logic draws 
not on knowledge drawn from the sector, but rather applies more general principles of 
management to the sector under consideration. For example, ideas about how to teach reading 
that are grounded in research on reading or notions of how to run a discussion that are based in 
the properties of good discussion are approaches that are grounded in field-specific knowledge 
and practice rather than a broader technocratic logic. 
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 This set of lenses raises a different set of questions and implications which I return to in 
the discussion and conclusion. From this viewpoint, what is at stake in the struggle over school 
accountability is the autonomy of the educational field from experts from other fields who seek 
to import a logic of data-driven organizational rationalization (the techonocratic logic) into the 
educational sphere (on logics see Friedland and Alford 1991).  Below we consider questions of 
why this technocratic logic has been so popular, but also why the educational sphere has been 
largely unable to resist, which, I argue, relates to the weak way that the profession was 
historically institutionalized.   
 The penetration of a logic into a field raises a different set of considerations than the 
jurisdictional competition perspective originated by Abbott (1988). In jurisdictional competition, 
two sets of claimants are seeking to do the work of a sector of human activity, such as the 
competition between psychiatrists and psychologists or between shamans and doctors. In 
contrast, when the case is about the penetration of an external logic into a field, there is no 
prospect that the practitioners in the field will suddenly be replaced en masse by outsiders. What 
is at stake is subtler but no less significant: that the standards of the field and the activities within 
the field will gradually be transformed into a metric that is foreign to the internal standards or 
practice of the field (MacIntyre 1981). 
 
CYCLICAL PATTERNS: CRISIS IDENTIFIED, EXTERNAL LOGIC PROMISES A SOLUTION, 
POLITICAL ACTORS RALLY IN SUPPORT, TEACHERS UNABLE TO RESIST 
THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CREATING THE FOUNDATION FOR RATIONALIZATION 
The first movement to accountability came in the Progressive Era. Muckraking 
journalists framed the problem and provided the impetus for action. The initial spark came from 
Joseph Mayer Rice’s exposé of school practices in 1892.  Rice, a doctor by training, traveled to 
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schools in 36 cities over the course of six months, and published a nine-part series in The Forum 
criticizing the dullness of recitation as a method of learning and the failure of superintendents to 
introduce more effective pedagogical methods to the classroom. Rice reserved much of his 
outrage for teachers, who he saw mainly as incompetents who had gained their positions through 
patronage. To these criticisms he added a comparative research method that sought to explain 
why third grade reading and math were taught more effectively in some schools than in others. In 
the two decades that followed, many of the themes that Rice had initially championed were 
repeated by other muckrakers, and the idea that the schools were inefficient and corrupt was 
widely repeated in the low-price popular magazines, whose combined circulation by 1905 was 
5.5 million.4   
 In education reform, as in other fields, the muckrakers played a critical role in spurring 
action. Richard Hofstadter has argued that “to an extraordinary degree the work of the 
Progressive movement rested upon its journalism.”5  For example, in the legislative fight over 
centralization in New York a senator cited Rice’s indictment of the school system to demonstrate 
that the results “were far below the standard in other cities; that the methods employed in the 
classroom were nothing short of ‘dehumanizing’; that the whole system was not only antiquated 
but actually pernicious.”6 Reformers also used other critiques of schools to their advantage, such 
as Leonard Ayres study of “retardation” in the schools7 and the dismaying results of army IQ 
tests.8  David Tyack’s work on centralizing education reforms in four cities reaches the following 
conclusions about the patterns of reform: “Like reforms in public health, city government or 
police and welfare work, urban educational reform followed a familiar pattern of muckrakers’ 
exposure of suffering, corruption, or inefficiency; the formation of alliances of leading citizens 
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and professional experts who proposed structural innovations; and a subsequent campaign for 
‘non-political’ and rational reorganization of services.”9  
 With the problem defined as inefficiency and variation in performance, it was not 
surprising that Taylorism appeared as an attractive solution. The Taylor system of industrial 
management hit the public eye in 1910, with a promise to increase efficiency, raise profits and 
eliminate waste through a careful accounting of the costs and productivity of the various 
components of the production process. Perhaps the most famous manifestation of the efficiency 
movement was in the time-motion studies, which sought to capture in minute detail the 
differences between more and less effective workers, and to use these findings to boost 
productivity.  
Applied to the school system, scientific management meant an increased focus on 
cost accounting, empowering superintendents to use their discretion to increase the 
productivity of teachers and the system as a whole, and using measurement and testing to 
compare, improve and standardize practice across districts. One prominent strand of 
accountability, then as now, is its focus on financial accounting.  This took the familiar form 
of demands for improved record keeping, but it also took more novel forms, such as the 
system proposed by Newton, Massachusetts superintendent Frank Spaulding and Chicago 
professor Bobbitt to calculate the costs that school districts were spending per subject per 
hour. Spaulding claimed, for example, that he didn’t know whether music was more valuable 
than Greek, but that he knew that Greek cost more than music, and was therefore a far less 
efficient use of resources.10  Bobbitt conducted a survey of 25 high schools in seven states 
and used the data to specify the range of costs appropriate for a given subject; he excoriated 
the schools that fell above that range and hence were wasting valuable taxpayer money.  
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It was a short step from financial accounting to arguing (exactly as is argued today) that 
schools needed to be held accountable for the results they produced. The answer, as it was laid 
out by Bobbitt, was to create a system that was at the time an adaptation of the Taylor system 
and would look much like what we call today standards-based reform. The first stage was for 
standards to be set externally to the school itself.  Standards would serve both as a goal against 
which success could be measured and as a way of motivating schools to higher levels of 
performance. A second stage was measuring whether the students had achieved the standards.  
This could be accomplished through testing (standardized mathematics tests and handwriting 
scales were particularly popular standardized tests in use at the time), or simply through accurate 
accounting, such as counting the number of mathematical calculations that an 8th grader could 
complete in a minute with a given level of accuracy. In Bobbitt’s view, with goals clarified and a 
system of measurement in place, the teacher can know “whether she is a good teacher, a medium 
teacher or a poor teacher,” and supervisors would have “incontestable evidence of inefficiency 
against the weak teacher who cannot or refuses to improve.”11  
The recommendations of Bobbitt and Edward Cubberley, a Stanford education professor 
who was another prominent advocate of reform at the time, were widely adopted, particularly in 
the large cities. National Education Association meetings, the primary gathering point for 
educators at the time, were increasingly full of discussions of efficiency in education, with titles 
like “By What Standards or Tests Shall the Efficiency of a School or System of Schools Be 
Measured?” By March 1913, the American School Board Journal reported that teacher rating 
scales were used “almost without exception” in large cities.  Edward Thorndike of Columbia’s 
Teachers College had devised standard tests to evaluate students’ achievement in reading, math, 
spelling, handwriting and other school subjects, and in 1921 educational sociologist Ross Finney 
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reported that “at the present time scales and tests are used in all but unprogressive schools 
everywhere.” As of 1916, Cubberley reported that efficiency bureaus, which coordinated teacher 
and student testing, had been established in Boston, New York, New Orleans, Detroit, Kansas 
City, Rochester, and Oakland; by 1934 about 60 of the larger systems had adopted the school 
research bureaus.12  
The political success of the efficiency movement rested in part on how its assumptions 
were consistent with prevailing cultural assumptions of the times.  In the years between 1910 and 
the Great Depression, when the status of business was at perhaps an all-time high, the scientific 
efficiency models were spread widely through popular newspapers and magazines, and were 
applied to everything from farms to families to churches.13  Science and efficiency seemed to 
provide a way to instill order in a period of rapid change spurred by massive industrialization and 
immigration. As Herbert Kliebard has written, “Of the varied and sometimes frenetic responses 
to industrialism and to the consequent transformation of American social institutions, there was 
one that emerged clearly dominant both as a social ideal and as an educational doctrine. It was 
social efficiency, that, for most people, held out the promise of social stability in the face of cries 
for massive social change, and that doctrine claimed the now potent backing of science in order 
to ensure it.”14 
Such a climate heavily tilted the playing field in favor of the reformers, creating the 
politics needed to move and sustain the accountability movement. On the one side were an elite 
comprised of “good government” reformers, foundations, business elites, university presidents, 
and professors of education, who sought to take a localized and highly varied system of 
schooling and transform it into what Tyack (1974) famously called “the one best system.” These 
“administrative progressives” sought to wrest control away from a ward-based system of local 
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politics that seemed to reformers to be resistant to newly developing models of scientific 
management and efficiency. The reformers sought to concentrate administrative power in the 
superintendent, a figure that they thought should resemble the chief executive officer of a 
business, and oversight power in a small, ostensibly “non-political” school board, largely 
comprised of themselves or other men of similar class background.  In these aims they were 
quite successful, as the average size of school boards in large cities was reduced from an average 
of 21.5 in 1893 to 10.2 in 1914 to a median of seven by 1923.  Both case studies and larger-scale 
investigations suggest that school boards after centralization were largely composed of business 
and professional men.15   
The reformers faced significant opposition on both political and intellectual grounds.  In 
their goals of “removing schools from politics” and centralizing authority in city elites, not 
surprisingly they faced opposition from the local wards who were losing power in the 
centralizing wars. These divisions between city elites and community locals often mirrored 
divides between classes and between WASPs and immigrant Catholics; the less powerful groups 
in these disputes were not impressed by the claims of the “professionals” to be removing school 
administration from politics. As the battles raged city by city to consolidate school boards in the 
hands of business and political elites, opposition from teachers, labor unions, and other local 
constituencies was significant and sometimes victorious.16  
The desires of reformers, particularly school boards and superintendents, to standardize, 
measure, and direct the work of teachers and students through systems of testing and 
accountability also received political and intellectual criticism. Teachers, for reasons both self-
interested and philosophical, resented their loss of autonomy, the influence of outsiders in 
criticizing and rating their work, and the imposition of a factory model onto the process of 
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learning. Centralizing movements were one impetus for early teacher organizing in Chicago and 
elsewhere.17 The American Teacher, the official journal of the American Federation of Teachers, 
printed the following message on its front page in March 1916: “If efficiency means the 
demoralization of the school system; dollars saved and human materials squandered; discontent, 
drudgery and disillusion—we’ll have none of it!”  As one articulate teacher opposing the reforms 
put it in a 1912 issue of American Teacher, the efficiency reforms represented the 
commercialization of education: “We have yielded to the arrogance of ‘big business men’ and 
have accepted their criteria of efficiency at their own valuation, without question. We have 
consented to measure the results of educational efforts in terms of price and product—the terms 
that prevail in the factory and the department store. But education, since it deals in the first place 
with organisms, and in the second place with individualities, is not analogous to a standardizable 
[sic] manufacturing process. Education must measure its efficiency not in terms of so many 
promotions per dollars of expenditure, nor even in terms of so many student-hours per dollar of 
salary; it must measure its efficiency in terms of increased humanism, increased power to do, 
increased power to appreciate.”18 
However, then as now, ultimately the reformers were victorious, for reasons that are 
consistent with the idea-centered theory laid out above. The muckrakers framing of the crisis as 
one of inefficiency and lack of standardization in process and outcome paved the road for 
Taylorism. Taylorism was attractive because it emanated from a higher status field, sought to 
standardize schooling, and was consistent with a broader cultural regard for business methods 
and values. This framing of the problem brought in a wide variety of powerful allies within 
cities, who sought to empower superintendents to be the educational equivalents of captains of 
industry. Resistance thus was limited to the non-professional class and to teachers, who were 
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ultimately no match for these reformers, who had both greater political power and a solution that 
was consistent with the framing of the problem. Later accountability movements would both 
mirror many of these patterns and build upon the district-level pattern of rationalization that was 
created by these Progressive Era reformers. 
 
THE 1960S AND 1970S: THE NASCENT STATE ACCOUNTABILITY MOVEMENT; THE BRIDGE TO THE 
PRESENT 
 
A second accountability movement emerged four decades later, again following 
mounting criticisms of the schools, this time at the state level.  Two strands of criticism were 
prominent: one focused on whether schools were performing basic functions; the other on 
whether the schools were meeting their responsibilities to poor and minority children. Bestsellers 
like Arthur Bestor’s Educational Wastelands: The Retreat from Learning in our Public Schools 
(1953) and Rudolph Flesch’s Why Johnny Can’t Read (1955) bemoaned the excesses of 
pedagogically progressive education, and urged a return to basics like phonics and standards. 
The launching of Sputnik in 1958 seemed to validate these critics, and led almost immediately to 
an increased emphasis on math and science education. Meanwhile, civil rights advocates, 
beginning with Brown v. Board of Education and continuing through the civil rights movements 
of the 1960s were pointing to the ways that schools had traditionally not served minority 
students.  The passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965 began to address 
some of these concerns, and also prompted legislators such as Robert Kennedy to ask whether 
the new programs were going to achieve the results they intended.19  
 Further focusing attention on the discrepancy between programs and results was the 
release of the “Coleman report” in 1966. Commissioned by the U.S. Office of Education in 
accordance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the study was expected to show that differences in 
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the resources available to minority students would explain the differences in outcomes between 
them and more advantaged students. Instead, the report found that differences in outcomes were 
more attributable to differences in family background and peer composition than to school 
resources per se. The study has been called the “most significant educational study of the 20th 
century”20 and its impact on policy thinking continues to be felt to the present day. The 
significance of the report, as Coleman himself noted in an essay five years after its release, is that 
it “has had its major impact in shifting policy attention from its traditional focus on comparison 
of inputs (the traditional measure of school quality used by school administrators…) to a focus 
on output, and the effectiveness of inputs for binging about change in output.”21 The 
accountability movement that would emerge in the years that followed took this disjuncture as its 
raison d’etre, seeking to ensure that school spending would efficiently lead to better outputs.  
While the crisis in the Progressive Era was identified by muckraking journalists, in the 1960s it 
was the publication of a social scientific report that focused attention on the gap between inputs 
and outputs. 
With this production function frame set, a technocratic logic emerged again, this time 
from the Department of Defense. The Defense Department had initially pioneered many of the 
techniques which would come to be associated with rationalizing education. Building on the 
district-level accountability movements created in the Progressive Era, the goal this time around 
was to extend the reach to the state level, seeking to develop state-wide goals, assessments, and 
accountability systems. A review of the literature in 1974 found that the educational 
accountability movement had generated more than 4,000 books and articles on the subject, many 
of them “how to” works on how to introduce these techniques into education.22  At least 73 state 
laws seeking to create educational accountability were passed and an analysis of these laws 
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suggested that they featured the following techniques of scientific management: planning, 
programming budgeting systems (PPBS), management-by-objectives (MBO), operations 
analysis, systems analysis, zero-based budgeting, and program evaluation and review technique 
(PERT), among many others.23  Generally speaking, the aim was to identify learning objectives, 
collect data on the fulfillment of these objectives, evaluate the role that each part of the system 
was playing in achieving these objectives, and to both exert pressure on schools and reallocate 
funding in the hopes of producing better results. U.S. Office of Education Associate 
Commissioner Leon Lessinger, who was perhaps the most well-known proponent of educational 
accountability in the early 1970s, outlined the rationale for accountability in terms highly 
reminiscent of Taylorism: “Once we have standardized, reliable data on the cost of producing a 
variety of educational results…our legislators and school officials will at last be able to draw up 
budgets based on facts instead of on vague assertions. Through knowledge gained in the process 
of management, we will also be able to hold the schools accountable for results.”24 
Like Bobbitt before him, Lessinger also saw in industry a model for reform. He writes, 
“In business we judge the effectiveness of a firm by its profit, by investment return, and by other 
financial indicators. In a non-profit agency such as a school, we judge its effectiveness according 
to the benefits experienced by its clients (or in the case of education, its students).” Resisting 
claims that professional knowledge or expertise should insulate educators from the judgment of 
outsiders, Lessinger asserts that professionals are judged by one standard—results: “Ultimately 
there is only one test rest of professional competence: proof of results. For example, if an 
attorney loses as many cases as he wins, he will soon have none but the most ignorant 
impecunious clients. Neither special education nor experience by itself validates his claim to 
special wisdom.”  Channeling Bobbitt and Spaulding, Lessinger advocated for a measure that 
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would allow managers to evaluate the costs of educating a student per year per subject: “For 
example we do not know what the average cost of increasing a youngster’s reading ability by one 
year is: all we know is what it costs to keep him for one year with a textbook and a teacher… It 
would make much more sense if we moved from the concept of per-pupil cost to the concept of 
learning-unit cost, and focused on the cost of skill acquisition rather the cost of maintaining 
children in schools.”25 
The model of change shared Taylorist assumptions of schools as primarily organizational 
entities that could be engineered for higher productivity. Thomas James, an astute critic of the 
1960/1970s accountability reforms, wrote in 1968 that a “new cult of efficiency” was emerging 
paralleling the Progressive Era reforms. James highlighted the role of efficiency experts at the 
Defense department, and then argued that a “newer priesthood of economist and political 
scientists” had “joined the engineers in advising government about improving schools… The 
models they use are, like those of engineers adapted from among those long used to describe 
physical, mathematical, and mechanical relationships.” 26  
Again the opposition to the reforms came from teachers and humanistic educators. 
Teachers argued that accountability measures unfairly evaluate them for outcomes only partially 
under their control, and that an emphasis on testing would narrow the curriculum and would 
undermine important educational goals.  An article in the New York Times published in 1974, 
“Accountability Plan Angers Teachers, With Many Foreseeing Threat to Jobs” quoted a range of 
teacher objections to accountability plans. A teacher union representative in Ohio argued that 
unless certain conditions were met, “we don’t have enough control over the situation to be held 
accountable for the final product.” The NEA commissioned a study denouncing a Michigan 
accountability program as “ill-conceived” and “counter-productive.” Meanwhile, Del Gardner, a 
 20 
teacher in Bakersfield, California, said that an accountability program in his district had gotten 
“the teachers…so involved with testing…that they had little time for anything else. It was a 
misuse of testing and a misunderstanding of what accountability is all about.”27 
 While teachers rebelled against how testing affected their daily lives, some educators 
were more concerned with the effect on accountability programs on the shape of education as a 
whole. In an essay titled “Accountability from a Humanist’s Point of View,” C.A. Bowers of the 
University of Oregon warned that accountability movements played to populist views and risked 
that schools, rather than fostering students’ abilities to think critically, would simply respond to 
the most powerful segment of the public. In terms very similar to the 1912 critique of Taylorism, 
Bowers argued:  
“I suspect that another reason the advocates of accountability have not talked about 
education as an intellectual experience is that they have committed themselves to a 
quantitative system of measurement. There is some usefulness in knowing the rate at 
which a person can perform a skill. But I am not sure that we can measure objectively 
and quantitatively what a students learn in the social sciences and humanities unless they 
are rendered lifeless by being reduced to names, dates, and places… Educational 
measurement encourages teachers to offer a simplistic view of life, conditions students to 
look for the right or wrong answer without doing the hard work of thinking and wrestling 
with ambiguities, and allows the educator to maintain the illusion that he is conducting 
his enterprise on a scientific basis.”28 
 
What differentiates the second movement from the earlier and later ones is that it was 
only partially successful.  States did pass laws to create assessments and thousands of books and 
articles were written about educational accountability, but the outcome was not the remaking of 
schools and systems evident in the Progressive Era and the present. The most detailed evidence 
on this state standards movement comes from a series of reports by the Educational Testing 
Service and a consortium called the Cooperative Accountability Project.29 The picture that 
emerges is an early phase of a standards-based package. As of 1973, there were 42 state testing 
programs in 33 states, but most tested only in one or two grades.30  A section of one of these 
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reports titled “what’s happening with educational accountability” found that states had 
consistently completed the early, more informational, steps of the accountability model 
(developing objectives, conducting a needs assessment) but had not moved to the later, more 
contentious, aspects of the model (making consequential decisions on the basis of measured 
results). The activities in the states corresponded to this division: 38 states determined desired 
outcomes and 44 states conducted a needs assessment; but no states fully implemented a model 
that moved all the way to using data for consequential decision-making.31 
Why was this movement less successful than the one that preceded it and the one that 
followed?  Consistent with the explanation developed above, in this case the precipitating crisis 
and proposed solution were not able to mobilize a sufficient array of political backers to move 
the agenda.  While governors, legislators and courts were consumed by highly visible fights over 
divisive issues like desegregation and community control, the standards movement was mostly a 
project of good government officials within state departments of education. Standards, and 
particularly, accountability in this period were delimited by the inability of proponents to, in E.E. 
Schattschneider’s term, widen the conflict and create significant political momentum behind the 
proposed reforms.32  Survey evidence suggests 29 of the state programs were initiated by State 
Departments of Education; the legislature was initiating actor in only 5 states, and in 8 states it 
was a combined effort across multiple actors, often including the State Department of Education. 
The funding for these programs came largely from the federal government or jointly from the 
federal and state governments, and only rarely from the state governments.33  It is perhaps not 
surprising that state accountability systems which were largely initiated by State Departments of 
Education and paid for by the federal government were unable to gain more traction, as they 
frequently had neither political nor financial support from the states that in theory were 
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sponsoring them. While teachers unions consistently opposed these reforms and put considerable 
resources into defeating them, no similarly powerful group spoke up in their favor.34  
It is also worth noting that the “climate of the times” in the late 1960s was not as 
favorable to accountability logics as the Progressive period or the more recent one. Notions of 
free schooling and even deschooling were at their height, ideas which were the antithesis of the 
kind of ordered schooling that standards and accountability proponents envisioned. At the same 
time, movements to desegregate schools or give communities greater control over them also 
generated much greater political passion during this period than staid visions of more efficiently 
administered schooling.   
Overall, the contours of the second accountability movement resembled the earlier and 
later ones in a number of key respects: a crisis that defined the problem as a need to improve the 
relationships between inputs and outputs; proponents who argued that the benefits of data, 
quantification, and objectivity could create standardization across an unwieldy school system; 
and critics who argued that the measurable was crowding out the meaningful and that managerial 
systems from above were likely to alienate those actually doing the work in schools.  The one 
major difference between this movement and the ones that came earlier and later is that it was 
not the most powerful reform movement in its own time. It was clearly overshadowed by 
explosive nation-wide battles over desegregation and community control.  As such, it never 
achieved the kind of broad and deep political momentum that it would have needed to really 
push and alter school practice. But it did create a series of assessments and a policy template that 
would be used and revived when standards-based reform gained political momentum in the 
1980s and 1990s. It served as a bridge between the district level rationalization of the 
Progressive Era and the modern state and federal accountability movement.  
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1980S TO THE PRESENT: COMPLETING THE RATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 
 The third and final school accountability movement began in the 1980s and has continued 
through the present, and it too was launched by a famous report questioning the quality of 
American schooling. In this case, a report of the National Commission on Educational 
Excellence, A Nation at Risk, famously declared the American school system a “rising tide of 
mediocrity” that imperiled the nation’s economic future. In support of its case, it cited a variety 
of academic indicators, most notably high levels of illiteracy, poor performance on international 
comparisons, and a steady decline in SAT scores from 1963 to 1980.   Quoting analyst Paul 
Copperman, the report claimed that this would be the first time in the history of the country that 
the educational skills of one generation would not be equal to those of their parents. Contrasting 
this declining educational picture with the centrality of skills and human capital in the 
knowledge-based post-industrial economy, the report linked the future of the nation’s 
international economic competitiveness to the reform of its educational system (National 
Commission on Educational Excellence 1983). 
 It is difficult to overstate the impact of A Nation at Risk. The U.S. Government Printing 
Office received more than 400 requests for copies in a single hour the following day and 
distributed more than six million copies over the course of the next year. The press interest was 
insatiable: The Washington Post published almost two articles per week on A Nation at Risk in 
the year following the report’s release.35  More than 250 state commissions (an average of 5 per 
state!) were created to analyze state education policies and make recommendations for action. 
Looking back two decades later, a series of essays assessing the report’s impact suggested that 
the conventional wisdom was that it had stimulated the movements for standards-based reform at 
both state and federal levels in the 20 years that followed (Gordon 2003, see also Author 2006).  
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By polemically documenting the failings of American schooling, and linking this crisis of 
educational quality to economic concerns, A Nation at Risk both stimulated action and defined 
the educational problem as centrally an economic one. 
 The key to this movement was that A Nation at Risk had generated a powerful and multi-
faceted constituency for change. By framing the problem as an urgent economic one, it raised the 
salience of education for governors, state legislators, and business groups, each of which became 
much more involved in the educational arena. While the policy proposals around standards were 
a virtual replay of what had been suggested during the late 1960s, the politics this time were 
entirely different, as a much more powerful constituency was now backing the movement (see 
Author 2011). 
For liberals, school accountability promises standardization in the sense of greater 
equity—the hope is to diminish the variation in school quality across poorer and richer areas. 
Data, particularly disaggregated data, will shed light on the failings of schools to serve minority 
students; and this information, it is hoped, will lead to a greater infusion of resources or 
improved practice.  At the same time, while moving towards equity goals, school accountability 
is a technocratic solution that does not fundamentally upset the geographic distribution of 
advantage; timid politicians can take small steps towards equity without fundamentally 
threatening advantaged suburban constituents.36 
For conservatives, the promise is less in standardizing practice and more in the hopes of 
accountability. Conservatives repeatedly stressed the importance of accountability to ensuring 
that the school system is delivering properly for the money spent on it. Particularly in recent 
years, the growth of teachers unions and their support for the Democratic Party have further 
spurred conservative desires to hold the educational establishment or “blob” accountable for their 
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results. In this respect, conservative support for accountability is in part a response to the 
growing power of teachers as a political force.  Some conservative have also seen accountability 
as a way for Republicans to “issue trespass” on an issue that has traditionally been in the 
Democratic column.37  
Civil rights advocates and business groups have also been unlikely allies in the most 
recent rounds of standards-based reform. While not all civil rights groups have supported the 
reforms, those who have see in the reforms a way of making schools, particularly those that 
house poor and minority students, respond to external policies which have had little impact on 
their practice. For example, the Citizens Commission on Civil Rights released a report that 
sharply criticized the lack of implementation of the 1994 ESEA.  Arguing that these states were 
subverting the intention of the law, the Commission noted:  “Many states and local officials have 
received the impression that the new Title I is largely a deregulation law that will free them from 
bothersome federal conditions, and have failed to understand that the tradeoff in the law is higher 
standards and accountability for results.”38 Business groups, for their part, have also advocated 
for standards through the Business Roundtable, with the rationale that economic competitiveness 
is largely built on the backs of more highly skilled workers. While business groups and civil 
rights groups usually lie on opposite sides of the partisan divide, both have supported standards 
and accountability as a mechanism of seeking to direct schools to improve students with higher 
levels of skills. 
The result has been a landslide of political support for standards and accountability in 
recent decades. Forty-two states had embraced standards before they became a part of federal 
law through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1994. No Child Left Behind passed 
with overwhelming support from both House and Senate in 2001. Everyone from Bill Clinton 
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and Edward Kennedy on the left, and George W. Bush and John Boehner on the right have at one 
time been strong champions of standards and accountability. The cleavages have been less 
partisan and more institutional, arraying not left against right, but rather those seeking to create 
systemic change from the center against those in the field who sought to resist it. 
But where did standards-based reform come from? Yet again, those who sought to reform 
education turned to an external field for an approach to rationalization, this time drawing on 
management theorists. In this round, no fewer than three different sets of ideas vied for control. 
The first vision drew on management theorists who, ironically, were trying to move away 
from the command and control structures created during Taylor’s age. The work of the 
management theorists, including Edward Deming, Peter Drucker, and, Reinventing Government 
gurus David Osborne and Ted Gabler (1992) argued the large bureaucracies formed in the 
industrial age were anachronistic in a rapidly moving, consumer-driven, information-age 
economy. Granting greater power to front-line workers would allow them to respond more 
quickly to changing circumstances. Front-line workers not only have more information about 
local conditions; granting them greater authority would also improve morale, generate ownership 
among employees, increase commitment and raise productivity. In terms of education reform, 
this would mean that schools should be governed by a structure that was “tight on ends and loose 
on means,” meaning that government would hold schools accountable for producing results, but 
would leave them free to devise the means. In 1986, the National Governors Association 
produced a document Time for Results, that embraced this very “horse trade” and many continue 
to see it as the governing principle of the standards movement (Carnegie 1986). 
The second vision was authored by Mike Smith and Jennifer O’Day, and it aimed to 
rationalize the entire system but for professional purposes. Smith and O’Day (1991) were wary 
 27 
of the idea that schools, if given freedom to innovate, would produce needed change at scale.  
Instead, they proposed to organize the entire system around standards: standards would define 
what students would learn, what teachers should be able to do, how teacher preparation institutes 
should aim their efforts, and how professional development efforts should be oriented. Smith and 
O’Day, a professor and graduate student at Stanford, were sympathetic to professional models of 
reform—they wanted teachers to teach using the most advanced methods available in the field—
but they also shared the systematizing instincts of the Taylorists, in that they wanted to use 
standards to create a standardization of practice across the nation’s many schools.  
The third vision is the one that has prevailed in No Child Left Behind. If the Smith and 
O’Day vision was one of collective professional responsibility, the alternative view has been one 
that has emphasized lay accountability. In this view, the problem is less in what teachers’ do not 
know and more in the lack of incentive motivating them to act. Prominent conservative Chester 
Finn laid out this view in his 1991 book titled, not coincidentally, We Must Take Charge.  Finn 
emphasized that the primary problem of the system was that incentives were not designed around 
results. He quoted favorably a line by then Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander: “Teaching 
is the only profession in which you are not paid one extra cent for being good at your job.”  
Painting with a broad brush, Finn argued that schools are like other public sector enterprises—
slow, inefficient and focused more on not rocking the boat than on creating innovative practice.39  
Underlying this range of arguments is a view of human nature as largely motivated by external 
incentives: “When it comes to academic learning, I believe that external consequences are the 
main determinant of how hard most of us work and how much we accomplish.”40  In this view, 
using data to enforce accountability to the public is the key to system improvement.   
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All three of these visions have made some inroads in the years between 1986 and the 
present, and the standards and accountability movement has drawn support from people who 
believe in each of them. But No Child Left Behind represents the triumph of the third view, 
which is closest to original Taylorist precepts. The rate of improvement expected in No Child 
Left Behind reflects legislators’ impatience with the failings of educators, and the system of 
escalating consequences for failing schools is consistent with the motivational view of lay 
accountability.  The requirements for annual testing have led to the use of multiple-choice off the 
shelf tests, contrary to the hopes of those like Smith and O’Day who hoped that more complex 
assessments could spur more advanced methods of teaching.  
The triumph of the lay accountability view is perhaps not surprising when viewed within 
the broader political climate of the times. The post-Reagan period has been one which has 
featured high levels of skepticism of the efficacy of government and renewed emphasis on 
ensuring that every public dollar is well spent. In such a climate, lay accountability views are 
consistent with conservative views of the need to hold public sector employees accountable, and 
are also attractive to middle of the road Democrats who seek to shed the “tax and spend label” 
and demonstrate their populist bona fides by ensuring that government employees deliver the 
return that the public expects.  In a period which featured declining trust in government and 
rising neoliberalism, it is not surprising that efforts to rationalize schools and hold them 
accountable to the lay public have found a variety of political champions. 
Opposition to the lay view of accountability has again come from teachers and schools, 
who have yet again argued that quantification elevates the measurable over the meaningful, that 
schools share with society responsible for student outcomes, and that the expected rates of 
progress are not realistic. But from 1983 to the present, these objections have been largely 
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pushed to the side, as central actors have pushed to rationalize the system from the top. Only 
when faced with the prospect of 70 percent or more of schools designated as failing under NCLB 
has the Obama administration finally begun to change course by offering waivers to states that 
would allow them to opt out of No Child Left Behind. No Child Left Behind completed the 
rationalization of schooling nationwide, but it has proven unable to achieve the results its 
proponents (from the Progressives to the present) had promised. 
 
AN IMPORTANT UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL REALITY: THE ORGANIZATION OF EDUCATION AS 
A BUREAUCRATIC HIERARCHY RATHER THAN A DOMAIN OF PROFESSIONAL CONTROL 
 
 If the underlying pattern of each of these movements is one of ideas sparking a political 
movement for external accountability, there are also some underlying structural realities which 
can help us to understand why such similar ideas have been so repeatedly alluring. Among them 
are: 1) the way in which a highly decentralized system with a highly unequal social geography 
and weak welfare state produces highly heterogeneous outcomes which strengthened the case for 
efforts to create greater standardization; 2) the ways in which technocratic solutions promise to 
improve outcomes without taking on more politically divisive questions of distributive justice; 
and 3) the way in which education was organized into a bureaucratically-administered hierarchy 
rather than a field of professional control, a form which has proven to be particularly conducive 
to the kind of principal-agent claims that are at the essence of school accountability regimes. 
Since the first two points have been more extensively covered in the literature, I focus here on 
the last point, the way in which the profession was organized. 41 
School teaching, like the similarly feminized semi-professions of nursing and social 
work, never developed the characteristics that defined the more traditional professions (Etzioni 
1969, Lortie 1975). Primary and secondary school teaching in the United States does not possess 
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the characteristics that are common in more fully professionalized fields: lengthy training, social 
closure over who can enter its ranks, or a pedagogical knowledge base that is widely respected 
by the public.  Initially a career option primarily for women before they had children, teaching in 
the Progressive Era was incorporated within a bureaucratic-management model in which 
teachers reported directly to administrators and established little professional control of their 
own. While loose coupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977) preserved some professional autonomy at 
the classroom level, teachers have not taken collective control of their practice and remain 
institutionalized within a hierarchical bureaucracy.  Teachers were also under the thumb of the 
state from the start, which presumably somewhat weakened their ability to assert independent 
professional power (Krause 1996, Light 1995).  The result has been that, in comparison to 
stronger professions that came to take control of their own affairs, the way that education was 
institutionalized has left the field particularly vulnerable to administrator-led rationalization.  
At the same time, it is possible to imagine a stronger profession of teaching within the 
state, and it is historical factors that can explain the particularly weak institutionalization of 
American teaching, in particular the circumstances of its organizational imprinting (Stinchcombe 
1965).  Part of this occurred for reasons previously discussed—a cadre of elites in the 
Progressive Era who believed in a Taylorist model of management successfully were able to turn 
a diffuse set of one room schoolhouses into a “one best system” of bureaucratic efficiency under 
the thumb of a CEO-like superintendent (Tyack 1974). But another set of actors were also 
important (and influenced many of Tyack’s lay reformers): university departments of education 
and the models of educational administration that they propagated.  
 At the turn of the century, the field of education was only just emerging as a university 
subject, usually housed as a sub-discipline within philosophy departments.  Faculty within many 
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of the top flight universities considered the study of education not worthy of the title of either art 
or science, and were particularly skeptical that the largely female dominated field of teaching 
was worthy of the professional training accorded to male dominated fields of law, medicine or 
engineering.42 Facing this climate of skepticism, deans and department chairs of education like 
Edward Cubberley (at Stanford), James Earl Russell (at Columbia), and Hubbard Judd (at 
Chicago) moved to shift the study of education away from its diffuse humanistic focus and 
towards a more practical and specialized view of educational administration grounded in 
emerging findings from science. At Teachers College, Russell became “one of the foremost 
advocates for a professional science of education. He believed that professional knowledge could 
enhance teaching, an improvement which would, in turn, foster a more generous attitude toward 
education among both academics and the public at large.”43    
 The training of administrators provided an opportunity for education departments to train 
a new class of male professionals whose role was widely being discussed as equivalent to that of 
a CEO. This offered a way for education departments to see themselves more on a par with 
professions like medicine, law and engineering, and eliminate the stigma that came with training 
a largely feminized profession. As Cubberley described it in his classic textbook, Public School 
Administration:  
“School supervision represents a new profession, and one which in time will play a very 
important part in the development of American life. In pecuniary, social, professional and 
personal rewards it ranks with the other learned professions, while the call for city school 
superintendents of the right type is today greater than the call for lawyers, doctors or 
ministers.  The opportunities offered in this new profession to men of strong character, 
broad sympathies, high purposes, fine culture, courage, exact training and executive 
skills…are today not excelled in any of the professions, learned or otherwise.”44  
 
Cubberley continued by suggesting that superintendents should be expected to complete college 
and one year of graduate school, and many should continue to the Ph.D., while teachers needed 
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only a high school education and a two-year training program. For a university discipline seeking 
to gain its footing, developing a science of school administration that required extensive training 
and that would be overseen by a largely male administrative corps provided a way for education 
departments and schools to claim greater equivalence with higher status fields like medicine and 
law.45  
 In so doing, they embraced a hierarchical and differentiated model of research, 
administration, and implementation that provided much of the template for the accountability 
movement. A largely quantitative and statistical research program would be carried out by the 
scientists in the university, who would convey it to the highly trained school administrators, who 
would implement it, with teachers as the final links in the chain at the bottom of the totem pole. 
As testing expert Edward Thorndike encapsulated this hierarchical approach in his 1906 text The 
Principles of Teaching: “It is the problem of the higher authorities of the schools to decide what 
the school shall try to achieve and to arrange plans for schools’ work which will attain the 
desired ends. Having decided what changes are to be made they entrust to the teachers the work 
of making them.”46  It is not surprising that, with this template in mind, what emerged was a 
program of scientific efficiency that allowed superintendents to supervise, evaluate, and compare 
the work of different teachers and schools, with the goal of using comparative data and research 
to establish best practices for improving performance and the efficiency of administration.  
 John Dewey provided an alternative model of the organization of schooling and research, 
and the failure of this model reveals the strength of institutional imperatives pulling in the 
opposite direction. In Dewey’s famous laboratory school, the school itself served as a primary 
opportunity for research. In Dewey’s view, there was no need to partition the role of researcher 
and teacher, arguing instead that both were interested in the same subject—improving learning. 
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Rather than have “one expert dictating educational methods and subject-matter to a body of 
passive, recipient teachers,” Dewey advocated “the adoption of intellectual initiative, discussion, 
and decision throughout the entire school corps.”  But while Dewey’s ideas were widely 
discussed, his model of research as a function to be shared between researchers and 
schoolteachers was rejected by university education departments, which were seeking to elevate 
themselves precisely by distancing themselves from teachers. As Ellen Lagemann puts it: “His 
position was very much at odds with the hierarchy then developing among educational 
institutions, a hierarchy in which mostly male university scholars of education would generate 
the knowledge needed by mostly male school administrators, who would, in turn, be responsible 
for dictating and supervising the instructional methods to be used by teachers in schools, 
especially the mostly female teachers involved at the elementary levels.”47 
 This hierarchical structure has remained in place in the years since, and has left teachers 
with little collective ability to respond to movements seeking to impose principles of 
rationalization.  In other work, I compare movements for accountability in K-12 education with 
similar movements in higher education and find that the latter have been much weaker because 
of the way that higher education developed a guild-like structure where faculty retain 
considerable collective determination over the direction of their core professional activities 
(Author 2011).48  In contrast, in K-12 education, teachers responded to their lack of power by 
following an industrial union model, which, while increasing their pay, working conditions and 
political power, actually reaffirmed the distinction between labor and management that 
technocratic logic rests upon. Efforts by teacher union leaders like Albert Shanker, Bob Chase, 
Adam Urbanski and others to move away from this hierarchical model and give teachers more 
responsibility for their practice have been largely unsuccessful in changing this overall structure. 
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Administrators have been largely unwilling to yield power, and teachers have been reluctant to 
move away from the industrial unionism model and the protections it affords (see Author 2006 
for more details).  
 Given this institutional structure, public school administrators, for their part, have largely 
been carriers of these external technocratic logics, as they sit in essentially middle manager 
positions between teachers and schools and the politicians who oversee them.  Districts today in 
particular are awash in a range of management positions, like chief accountability officers, 
whose central function is the development of these rationalizing logics. While accountability 
movements do not pose the kind of jurisdictional competition that Abbott (1988) chronicles, they 
do present something potentially just as significant—the widespread embrace of an external 
technocratic logic by many of the most powerful people within the profession. 
 If resistance and capitulation are the two most visible responses to technocratic logic, 
there is also a third option which some leaders of the profession have sought to pursue. These 
leaders have their own critique of the failings of the educational field—that precisely because it 
was not institutionalized into a stronger profession it has weak norms of collective practice to 
guide school improvement. These leaders share the desire of the Taylorists to “systemic reform” 
(Smith and O’Day 1991), but they are much more committed to these systems being guided by 
professional knowledge about teaching and learning. Their diagnosis of the problem similarly 
relates less to the need to motivate teachers to work harder for improvement, and more to the 
idea that increasing their knowledge and skills is the key to progress in schooling (Elmore 2004). 
In essence, there are two seemingly similar, but in fact highly divergent views of “standards” as 
the key to reform: the currently prevailing “hard” version which emphasizes the need for 
competition, seeks to hold professionals accountable to the public, and tries to exert pressure to 
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change a moribund public system; and a “softer” view which emphasizes the need for 
professional collaboration, wants the public to gain enough confidence in the field to defer to 
professional knowledge, and sees increased the knowledge and skill of practitioners as the key to 
successful reform.  The outcome of this struggle is the difference between on the one hand, the 
educational field again being penetrated by an external technocratic logic, and, on the other, the 
leaders of the field effectively using the external desire for system-wide change to help 
professionalize the field.49 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The most recent standards and accountability movement is actually the third movement 
of its type in the 20th century.  While the context of these accountability movements have 
gradually shifted upward from local to state to federal, in their ethos and theory of action they 
share similar characteristics to the process of rationalization that Weber so presciently identified. 
 This recurrent instinct to rationalize schools is not easily explained by partisan or interest 
groups theories. A wide range of different actors have supported the reforms, including liberals 
and conservatives, civil rights advocates and business groups, state departments of education and 
university departments of education. There is no one set of initiating actors that was important in 
all three of the cases. Business groups, who one might imagine would be lead actors, took a back 
seat to political actors in the most recent reforms, and were not involved in the 1960s reforms. 
Other theories which emphasize that conflicts of values among the public might lead to this kind 
of cycling of reforms are plausible, but are vague and do not offer a specific explanation for the 
recurrence of accountability-centered reforms. 
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 The penchant for rationalizing schools is better understood as a process by which a 
technocratic logic comes to penetrate the educational sphere. Looking across the cases we see a 
recurring pattern: schools are declared to be in crisis by an authoritative source; a high status 
epistemic community offers a solution premised on what they claim are scientifically validated 
premises of management practice; a wide variety of actors external to the schools back such a 
logic because it gives them a way to control and create greater standardization of schools from 
the outside, over the objections of teachers who resent accountability and see aspects of their 
practice being compromised; these objections are unable to carry the day because of the weak 
status and institutionalization of a highly feminized profession.  Despite other major differences 
in the periods under study, these patterns remain remarkably consistent across periods. 
 This theory can explain the distinctive political cleavages created during episodes of 
accountability-centered reform. There is no one recurring lead proponent of the reforms because 
technocratic logic appeals to a wide variety of external actors for different reasons. Liberals see 
in it a way to create greater equalization of school process across a highly decentralized 
landscape. Conservatives see in it a way to assure that public dollars are being spent efficiently, 
and to motivate a recalcitrant sector for reform. The cleavages of rationalizing movements are 
less left vs. right than top vs. bottom, or outsiders vs. insiders. The commensurating logic of 
measurement-driven change unites those who are outside of schools and seeking to create change 
within them against teachers who are being held to account.   
While business groups have not been the lead actors in each round of reforms, business 
logic is common across the cases. Higher status epistemic communities, often tied to industry or 
using ideas derived from industry, have repeatedly been able to overwhelm a weakly 
institutionalized professional field. Particularly in the Progressive Era and the present, these 
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ideas from the business community have resonated widely with policymakers and the broader 
public. The weakly professionalized education sector has proven no match for these higher status 
epistemic communities, and many educators, particularly in administrative positions, have ended 
up implementing logics imported from other sectors.  While educational accountability has 
previously been discussed largely in terms of equity, issues of professional jurisdiction are also 
at stake. 
One obvious question is why these movements have had to recur, given that they were 
mostly fairly successful in accomplishing their aims. The most straightforward answer is that 
they take place at different institutional levels: the Progressive Period created an early system of 
standards, tests and accountability at the district level; the reformers of the late 1960s and early 
1970s sought to extend these efforts to create state standard-based reform; and then the reformers 
from the 1980s to the present created a much more robust system of state-level accountability, 
which in turn provided the foundation for federal reform through No Child Left Behind. It is less 
that the previous movements were defeated and more that the newer movements sought to build 
upon and supersede earlier ones by extending the reach of school accountability movements at 
higher levels. 
It is worth noting that while rationalizing reforms have been recurrently popular 
throughout the United States over the past century, there is no iron law of school rationalization, 
and there are other approaches which have also gained favor. School accountability approaches 
at different times have had to contend with movements for desegregation, community control, 
and a variety of market-based strategies, among many others. Despite the claims of reformers 
that standards would commensurate all of the important goals of schooling, there have been 
periods in which the state-centered scientific management approach has not been at the top of the 
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agenda, as shifts in values have prioritized other approaches to thinking about improving 
schooling (Labaree 1997). The most recent decision of the Obama administration to let states 
apply for waivers that would allow them to opt out of key provisions of No Child Left Behind 
may be an indication that the current emphasis on state and federal school accountability is 
finally beginning to run its course. At the same time, the growing momentum behind Common 
Core standards may presage yet another round of external standards-driven change. 
For teachers, the implication of this analysis is that teaching needs to strengthen its 
professional core if it does not want to be repeatedly vulnerable both to external movements for 
accountability and the infusion of external technocratic logics. The recent movements to appoint 
those with little to no education experience to run major school systems are only the most current 
manifestation of a century-long pattern. Whether fair or not, unless educators develop the 
characteristics associated with more developed professions—a robust knowledge base, a method 
of selecting, training and licensing that produces skilled practitioners, and ongoing standards for 
monitoring practice—it will remain at the whim of external actors and logics seeking to control 
the field.  
One hope of such an approach would be to change the relationship between schools and 
policymakers. Schools and teachers are weak actors, as this essay has emphasized, with respect 
to policy decisions about school accountability, in part because they lack the collective 
credibility that comes with a stronger profession. But they have had considerable impact in the 
implementation of school accountability: as other studies have suggested, when the aims of 
policymakers outstrip the capacity of local actors to realize them, those actors have a variety of 
ways of using their power as street-level bureaucrats to resist, dilute, game, become 
overwhelmed, or otherwise act in ways that are contrary to what policymakers hope when they 
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enact the policy (Elmore 2004, Booher-Jennings 2005).  One aspiration of a more 
professionalized system is that policymakers and schools would not see one another as enemies, 
and hence could work more collaboratively to develop policies that would enable teachers, rather 
than being actively resisted by the people who are expected to implement them. 
Such an approach is also needed because the literature on implementation suggests that 
the task of teaching and the organization of the school system are fundamentally impervious to 
top-down rationalization, especially if the goal is to teach to high-level skills.50 American 
schools are famously organized into loosely coupled systems, and classrooms, especially good 
classrooms, are staffed by able teachers who are able to successfully navigate and manage the 
literally hundreds of decisions that need to be made over the course of even one class (Huberman 
1993). For these reasons, efforts to rationalize teaching from above have repeatedly not achieved 
what its proponents have promised; as in many fields with complex work, a more professional 
approach that focuses on developing usable knowledge, strengthening training, providing clinical 
opportunities for learning, and then relying on the established skill of these practitioners is in the 
long run the more promising approach (Mehta, Bryk, and Gomez 2012). 
What is particularly complicated here is that while a technical analysis of the needs of 
teaching suggests the need for a more professional approach, the political winds over the past 30-
40 years have been shifting against the notions of professional control. Scholars of the 
professions have noted that the highpoint of guild power of the major professions was the mid 
1960s, and that market critiques and populist attacks have weakened its hold in the years since 
(Krause 1996).  The challenge for K-12 education in this environment is to try to draw upon the 
virtues of professionalism—developing expert knowledge in their fields, working within a 
normative code, and holding all practitioners to the standards of the field—while at the same 
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time navigating broader political waters that are much more skeptical of the whole notion of 
professional control. 
Emerging international evidence dovetails with this analysis and suggests that a more 
professional approach would not only increase teacher autonomy but also improve student 
outcomes. While this research is only in its early stages, the initial conclusions are supportive of 
the idea that professionalizing teaching is an important next step in improving outcomes. As 
OECD PISA Director Andreas Schleicher and Marc Tucker summarize lessons from 
comparative analysis of the PISA: “The education development progression is characterized by a 
movement from relatively low teacher quality to relatively high teacher quality; from a focus on 
low-level basic skills to a focus on high-level skills and creativity; from Tayloristic forms of 
work organization to professional forms of work organization; from primary accountability to 
superiors to primary accountability to one’s professional colleagues, parents and the public; and 
from a belief that only some students can and need to achieve high learning standards to a 
conviction that all students need to meet such high standards.”51  Policy in the United States has 
made this shift with respect to its ends—all students need to achieve to high levels—but its 
means are still grounded in trying to tighten the screws on a Progressive era Taylorist 
bureaucracy. If the goal in the long run is not simply to hold schools accountable but to get them 
to consistently produce at higher levels of practice, the United States will need to move away 
from its recurring emphasis on scientific methods of control from above and embrace the more 
professional path that is characteristic of top performing nations. 
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Notes
 
1 Some commentators have seen the latter two movements as part of one long move towards educational 
accountability that began in the 1960s. In one sense, this is true—that the states standards movement of the late 
1960s and early 1970s led into the minimum competency testing movement in the later 1970s, which in turn led into 
a more developed state standards movement in the 1980s. However, as will be documented below, the state 
standards efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s were only marginally successful at building a needed political 
constituency, and by the end of the 1970s there was little enthusiasm for large-scale school reform at the state and 
particularly federal levels, especially among Republicans. A Nation at Risk then launched a third round of school 
reform that built on some of the policy templates created in the 1960s, but this time with a much wider set of 
political backers. Given that the purpose of this article is to understand how educational accountability movements 
are launched, it makes sense to treat the two more recent cases as separate episodes, as each had their own history, 
set of initiating events, and set of actors involved. The latter was also much more successful than the former. 
2 In the Progressive period, the main shift was from one room schoolhouses to urban systems. 
3 Obviously there were minority elements within both parties that resisted accountability movements. In the most 
recent round, the most notable critics within the parties have been states rights conservatives (who see in 
accountability unwarranted expansion of state and federal power), libertarian conservatives (who see it as unwanted 
bureaucracy), and some liberals (who see it as overly focused on testing to the neglect of resources or other supports 
that would improve the lives of high poverty students). For more details on these political cleavages, see Author 
(2006).  
4 Callahan (1962: 3). 
5 Hofstadter (1955: 185).  
6 Tyack (1974: 151). 
7 Leonard Ayres published his 1909 book, Laggards in Our Schools, contending that schools were squandering 
resources by having students, particularly immigrant and minority students, repeat grades and eventually drop out. 
Ayres classified students as “retarded” if they were over age for their grade level, and constructed an “index of 
efficiency” that measured how effectively schools were moving their students along, and how much was being 
wasted on repeaters.  While, in the 19th century, holding children back had been seen as a sign of high standards, in 
the new context of an expanded student population and limited resources, it was seen as a waste of valuable tax 
dollars. 
8 Giordano (2005: 55). 
9 Tyack (1974: 128). 
10 Callahan (1962: 159). Although later scholars have heavily scrutinized Callahan’s arguments on the connections 
between business methods and school administration, his basic conclusions have emerged largely unscathed (Eaton 
1990).  
11John Franklin Bobbitt, quoted in Callahan (1962: 82). 
12 Callahan (1962) on the 1916 data; for the 1934 data see Resnick (1980). 
13 Callahan (1962: 43).  See Porter (1995) for examples of how cost-benefit thinking has been applied across a 
variety of (non-economic) dimensions. 
14 Kliebard (1995: 76) 
15 Tyack (1974: 127). 
16 Tyack (1974: 147-167). 
17 Murphy (1990: 23-45). While in this piece I emphasize the desire for order and standardization as the impetus for 
reformers, and teachers under-professionalization as the reason for their inability to resist, it is also possible to see 
the Progressive Era efficiency movements as a struggle for control between increasingly powerful superintendents 
and newly organized teachers. In this reading, even if the initial impetus for rationalization was the muckraking by 
Rice and others, the ongoing struggle is one in which administrative control seeks to grow to resist increasing efforts 
at teacher control. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this alternative interpretation. 
18 Callahan (1962: 121). 
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19 Kennedy is quoted from the transcript of the hearing on the ESEA, Senate Education Subcommittee, 89 th 
Congress. Quotation is accessed online at: http://drcookie.blogspot.com/2008/06/robert-f-kennedy-at-1965-hearings-
about.html 
20 Barbara J. Kiavat, “The Social Side of Schooling,” Johns Hopkins Magazine, April 2001. 
21 Coleman (1972): 149-150. 
22 Browder (1975: 1). 
23 Wise (1979: 12). Also see Wise (1979) for definitions of these various terms. 
24 Lessinger (1970: 10). 
25 Lessinger (1970:11). 
26 James (1976/1968: 40-41). 
27 Gene I. Maeroff, “Accountability Plan Angers Teachers, With Many Foreseeing Threat to Jobs,” New York Times, 
July 6, 1974, pg. 20. 
28 Bowers (1972: 29). 
29 See Educational Testing Service (1973), Hawthorne (1974), and Hawke et al (1975). 
30 Educational Testing Service (1973). 
31 Hawke et al. (1975: 27). 
32 Schattschneider (1960). 
33 Hawke et al. (1975). 
34 Murphy and Cohen (1974). 
35 Guthrie and Springer (2004: 12). 
36 McGuinn (2006). 
37 Of course, some states rights conservatives have opposed testing for its role in expanding federal power, and some 
libertarian conservatives have seen it as expanding bureaucracy in place of needed markets. For more details on 
these schisms, see Author (2006). 
38 Citizens’ Commission on Civil Rights (1998: 2). 
39 Finn (1991: 147-149). 
40 Finn (1991: 125). 
41 On the ways in which decentralization has both inspired and frustrated efforts for greater centrally-driven 
standardization of outcomes, see Cohen and Moffitt (2009). On the ways in which policymakers use technocratic 
logics to avoid discussions of distributive justice, see Orfield and Yun (1999) and Kozol (2005). 
42 As Harvard President Charles Eliot said, speaking for the Harvard faculty, “The faculty in common with most 
teachers in England and the United States feel but slight interest or confidence in what is usually called pedagogy.”42  
Similar attitudes were found at Stanford, where the Department of Education survived only due to its support from 
Stanford President David Starr Jordan; Jordan told Cubberley upon his arrival in 1898 that, if the decision had been 
left to the faculty, the department would have been abolished entirely.  At Columbia, President Seth Low was able to 
persuade the trustees to bring Teachers College within the umbrella of the university, but, as Dean of Teachers 
College James Earl Russell put it, not “as a professional school on par with the others…[but] as the stepchild of the 
University Department of Philosophy and Education” (Lagemann 2000: 63). 
43 Lagemann (2000: 64). 
44 Callahan (1962: 218). 
45 As Joncich and Guthrie (1988: 100) aptly sum it up: “Male teachers who stayed too long in the classroom—in the 
regular company of women and children—might even raise doubt about their manliness and, therefore, their 
suitability for dealing with the local power brokers on school boards and in chambers of commerce. Were these the 
men to save school administration and educational research careers from the threats of feminization, the men able to 
deal with businessmen and civic leaders in the hurly-burly world of realpolitik? Clearly not. Instead, graduate 
students in education must be drawn early from their classrooms or recruited from among the graduating seniors of 
high-status colleges.” 
46 Thorndike as quoted in Lagemann (2000: 60). 
47 Lagemann (2000: 51). 
48 While American higher education has had comparatively greater professional power, the claim is not that higher 
education is always a beacon of professional power nor that it is impervious to state rationalization. The growth of 
adjunct faculty has significantly eroded the traditional power conferred by faculty governance in American higher 
education.. Accountability movements of state universities in England reveal that states can impose their reach even 
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into stronger professional domains. The claim here is simply that, all else equal, state efforts to impose 
accountability will be weaker the stronger the profession is that contests them. This is consistent with the framework 
offered by Krause (1996), who sees a tripartite division between states, markets, and professions, and suggests that 
which is more powerful in a given place and time is dependent upon specific historical factors. 
49 See also Holmes Group (1986), Carnegie (1986). 
50 I think this is one way to read one aspect of the Cohen and Moffitt (2009) argument. 
51 Tucker and Schleicher (2010): 231.  
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